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1. Introduction
We reply to the recent comments on our paper [1] by Bassi and Ghirardi
[2] and Tumulka [3], and thank them for helping us explain our ideas more
clearly. We briefly summarize their criticisms and our responses to them.
They both start by equating our FIN axiom with Bell’s locality con-
dition; we agree that the latter is false, but argue that the former is true,
since it follows from relativity and causality.
Bassi and Ghirardi also questioned whether their ”hits” should count as
information subject to FIN - we recast our proof below to make it clear that
all that matters is that the responses of either particle cannot vary with
the choices of the other’s experimenter (this is the new assumption, MIN,
that replaces FIN, causality,and the Free Will assumption). It appears that
Bassi and Ghirardi do not accept even this, although it follows immediately
from relativistic invariance and experimental free will.
Some of Tumulka’s other criticisms involve the fact that the functions
controlling his flashes might be frame dependent. This does no harm to our
argument, because it used the particle responses, which cannot be frame
dependent even if the flashes are. Indeed frame dependence, rather than
removing contradictions, produces even more!
We now assent to Tumulka’s argument that the question of adding an
interaction term is irrelevant. However we show that, like the types of
∗jhorcon@yahoo.com; ⋆kochen@math.princeton.edu
1
2theory that Bassi and Ghirardi propose, rGRWf must fail MIN, despite
Tumulka’s assertion to the contrary.
2. Recasting the proof
We first recast our proof to make it clear that concerns about inertial
frame dependence and exactly what counts as information are irrelevant.
The postulated functions
θΛ1a (x, y, z, w, α) and θ
Λ2
b (x, y, z, w, β)
are now allowed to depend on possibly different inertial frames Λ1 and Λ2,
and α and β are information available to the two particles before their
responses (in the respective frames). Information that becomes available
to a only after the choice of x, y, z is still treated as at the end of the proof
in [1], and so is not considered here.
We have also introduced x, y, z, w as new arguments to θa and θb
(whether they vary with them or not). Then, as in Section 3 of [1], we
clear α and β of any dependence on x, y, z, w by replacing any information-
bit i that depends on x, y, z, w, by the values i1, ..., i1320 it takes for the
40 × 33 = 1320 particular instances of these variables we use. This yields
a further renaming of the θΛ1a (x, y, z, w, α
′) and θΛ2b (x, y, z, w, β
′) in which
α′ and β′ are now independent of x, y, z, w.
3. Our minimal assumption
A careful examination of [1] reveals that relativity, causality, FIN, and
the Free Will Assumption were used only to derive the following “minimal
assumption,” which now completely replaces them.
The MIN axiom. B can freely choose any one of the 33 particular
directions w independently of β′. Also, neither this choice nor b’s response
can be affected by A’s choice of x, y, z. Similarly A can choose any one
of the 40 triples x, y, z independently of α′, and neither this choice nor a’s
response can be affected by B’s choice of w.
The reason is twofold. It is B’s free will that allows him to choose w
independently of the earlier information β′. But in a suitable frame A’s
experiment will happen only five minutes later that B’s, and so w and
b’s response must also be independent of A’s choice and a’s response (for
3otherwise causality would be violated).1
The recast statement is that the axioms SPIN, TWIN and MIN already
imply that the responses of the particles cannot be given by functions of
the information accessible to them (i.e., that is earlier in some arbitrary
pair Λ1,Λ2 of inertial frames).
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4. Finishing the proof
The assumption MIN ensures that the values of θa and θb (being the
responses of the two particles) are in fact independent of w and x, y, z
respectively, so we can simplify their names by omitting those arguments:
θΛ1a (x, y, z, α
′) and θΛ2b (w, β
′) .
Now there is a value β0 of β
′ for which θ0(w) = θ
Λ2
b (w, β0) is defined for
one choice of w, and so, by MIN, for all 33. Similarly there is a value α0
of α′ for which θΛ1a (x, y, z, α(0)) is defined for one of the triples x, y, z, and
so by MIN for all 40.
Finally, by TWIN, we have (using the question-mark convention of [1])
θΛ1a (x?, y, z, α0) = θ0(x), θ
Λ1
a (x, y?, z, α0) = θ0(y), θ
Λ1
a (x, y, z?, α0) = θ0(z),
(these responses being independent of frame), and by SPIN, θ0(w) is a 101-
function, which contradicts the Lemma in Section 2 of [1]. This completes
the proof.
5. FIN Versus Bell locality
Our critics both start by equating FIN with Bell’s locality condition.
We were aware of course that Nature has non-local correlations - indeed
TWIN expresses one such, so that Bell locality is false. But we argued that
FIN is true, since it follows from causality and relativity, and so it is wrong
to equate FIN with Bell locality. By doing so, our critics have failed to
appreciate that compared to Bell’s theorem, ours has extra strength which
is needed for the application to GRW.
1We remind the reader that in [1] causality was explicitly assumed. Without this
assumption, what we show is that a relativistically invariant GRW theory has the defect
that no matter how we associate inertial frames to particles, some particle’s behavior at
a certain time in its frame must be affected by events that occur only at a later time.
2We remark that if, as in [1], we require θa and θb to depend only on information in
backward light cones, then correspondingly we need only require the free decisions to be
independent of information in those cones.
4However, since FIN has now been weakened to MIN, that discussion
is now irrelevant. This also makes it clear that Bassi and Ghirardi’s con-
cerns about which information is subject to FIN are immaterial - our new
condition MIN is just that a may not use w nor b use x, y, z.
It seems that Bassi and Ghirardi do not accept even this:
“. . . the outcome of the measurement which A performs on
particle a does – indeed it must – depend on the outcome of the
measurement performed by B on b (or vice-versa), in particular
on the choice of directions made by B . . .”
In the context of their discussion of “relativistic GRW models” this
admission is quite astonishing. For let us suppose that a’s response is
conditioned by B’s decision. Then in a frame in which B’s experiment
happens only 5 minutes later than A’s, this can be regarded either as
a gross violation of causality or a restriction on B’s freedom (since he
may make only those choices that are compatible with the already given
response).
6. Tumulka’s further criticisms
The above was also the first of Tumulka’s three supposed flaws in our
proof. His “third flaw” distinguishes between saying in every frame, or
in just one frame, that the information α′ that determines a’s response is
independent of w. The new proof obtains a contradiction from any one pair
of frames for which the particles’ responses are determined by functions θΛ1a
and θΛ2b .
The essential point is that a has only one response, which is indepen-
dent of frame. The contradiction is multiplied, rather than removed, by
introducing frame dependence.
Tumulka’s “second flaw” is similar. He says that “every frame Λ pro-
vides a different choice of the function fΛy [that determines the flash fy].”
But even if this is so, the particle responses that the flashes supposedly
determine cannot vary with the frame. Tumulka finds it acceptable for his
flashes to “entail influences to the past in [some] frames,” but we cannot
accept that future experimental decisions can influence the past responses
of particles as exhibited by macroscopic spots on screens.
Tumulka allows the function fΛy (FA, FB ,X1,X2, ...) that gives the flash
controlling one of the two particles to depend on both experimenters’
choices FA and FB . This would seem to make his theory rGRWf fail MIN,
5but in fact he claims that there is one frame which the flash fA does not
depend on the field FB and another in which fB and does not depend on
FA (see his Sections 8 and 7). If true, then MIN would hold in rGRWf, but
then our recast proof applies and produces a contradictory 101-function.
7. Invariance
Unlike Tumulka, who expects his final theory to be fully Lorentz in-
variant, Bassi and Ghirardi admit that their proposed type of theory “will
not be invariant in the ordinary sense,” but only in a weaker, stochastic,
sense. We welcome this frank confession that indeed a GRW theory cannot
be fully Lorentz invariant, which was all that we claimed. What can this
weaker, stochastic, sense of invariance mean? Not that the described kind
of theory is itself Lorentz invariant in any sense, as is shown by their state-
ment that “the jumps propagate instantaneously”. We presume that they
are merely claiming that its predictions will be (stochastically) invariant.
They justify this by claiming that this type of theory is as invariant
as QM is. This is simply wrong; the predictions of QM are, to a high
degree of approximation, fully invariant, not just stochastically so, and in
[1], we took care to state the ones we used in an invariant manner: that
if and when measurements of both particles in a given direction have both
been made, the responses will coincide.3 A credible explanation of how
reduction actually takes place should have the property that not only its
predictions, but the theory itself should be as invariant as Nature seems to
be.
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spin of a given variable exists with a precisely defined value until interaction with a
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instance in which particle No. 1 develops a definite spin component in, for example, the
z-direction, the wave function of particle No. 2 will automatically take such a form that
it guarantees the development of the opposite value of σz if this particle also interacts
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